For anyone interested in a good analysis of the consequences of extending unemployment benefits would produce (bold emphasis mine)…

Counter-productivity sets in when the incentives of an insurance policy become unbalanced. Insurance policies alter the incentives individuals face and have the well-known perverse effect of nudging the very behavior that would lead to a payout of the insurance policy. That is, the problem of moral hazard. Economists have found unemployment insurance affects an individual’s incentive to find a job by changing the constraints and opportunity cost of finding a job.

Unemployment benefits reduce the incentive and the pressure to find a new job by making it less costly to remain without work. Consequently, workers with UI benefits look for new jobs less rigorously than do workers without them. The typical unemployed worker spends about 32 minutes a day looking for a new job.[1] Workers eligible for UI benefits spend about 20 minutes a day looking for work during their 15th week of unemployment. They look much harder when their benefits are about to end, spending more than 70 minutes a day job hunting in the 26th week of unemployment.[2] Since workers with unemployment benefits search less rigorously for work until their benefits are about to expire, it typically takes them longer to find new jobs. Labor economists estimate that extending the potential duration of unemployment benefits by 13 weeks increases the average amount of time workers on UI remain unemployed by two weeks.[3]

This has economic consequences. Workers do not create economic wealth during the additional weeks they remain unemployed. They save and consume less because UI replaces only a portion of their wages. Labor markets become less flexible because it takes more time for workers to transition from one industry or state to another. This hinders overall economic growth.

via The Economics of Extending Unemployment Benefits.

This is from the Heritage Foundation.